[R.O. 1996 § 220.190; CC 1968 § 14-45; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A.
A person is not guilty of an offense unless
their liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act.
C.
Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor
knowingly procures or receives the thing possessed, or having acquired
control of it was aware of their control for a sufficient time to
have enabled them to dispose of it or terminate their control.
D.
A person is not guilty of an offense based
solely upon an omission to perform an act unless the law defining
the offense expressly so provides, or a duty to perform the omitted
act is otherwise imposed by law.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.200; CC 1968 § 14-46; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A.
Except as provided in Section 220.210, a person is not guilty of an offense unless they act with a culpable mental state, that is, unless they act purposely or knowingly or recklessly or with criminal negligence, as the ordinance defining the offense may require with respect to the conduct, the result thereof or the attendant circumstances which constitute the material elements of the offense.
B.
A person "acts purposely," or with purpose,
with respect to their conduct or to a result thereof, when it is their
conscious object to engage in that conduct or to cause that result.
C.
A person "acts knowingly" or with knowledge:
D.
A person "acts recklessly" or is reckless
when they consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, and such disregard
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable
person would exercise in the situation.
E.
A person "acts with criminal negligence"
or is criminally negligent when they fail to be aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow,
and such failure constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.205; CC 1968 § 14-47; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A.
If the definition of an offense prescribes
a culpable mental state but does not specify the conduct, attendant
circumstances, or result to which it applies, the prescribed culpable
mental state applies to each such material element.
B.
If the definition of an offense prescribes
criminal negligence as the culpable mental state, it is also established
if a person acts purposely or knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness
suffices to establish a culpable mental state, it is also established
if a person acts purposely or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices
to establish a culpable mental state, it is also established if a
person acts purposely.
C.
Knowledge that conduct constitutes an offense,
or knowledge of the existence, meaning or application of the ordinance
defining an offense is not an element of an offense unless the ordinance
clearly so provides.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.210; CC 1968 § 14-48; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
[R.O. 1996 § 220.215; CC 1968 § 14-49; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A.
A person is not relieved of criminal liability
for conduct because they engage in such conduct under a mistaken belief
of fact or law unless such mistake negatives the existence of the
mental state required by the offense.
B.
A person is not relieved of criminal liability
for conduct because they believe their conduct does not constitute
an offense unless their belief is reasonable and:
1.
The offense is defined by an administrative
regulation or order which is not known to them and has not been published
or otherwise made reasonably available to them, and they could not
have acquired such knowledge by the exercise of due diligence pursuant
to facts known to them; or
2.
They act in reasonable reliance upon
an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid
or erroneous, contained in:
[R.O. 1996 § 220.220; CC 1968 § 14-50; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A person with the required culpable mental state is guilty of an offense if it is committed by their own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which they are criminally responsible as set out in Section 220.225, or both.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.225; CC 1968 § 14-51; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A.
A person is responsible for the conduct
of another when:
1.
The ordinance defining the offense
makes them so responsible; or
2.
Either before or during the commission
of an offense with the purpose of promoting the commission of an offense,
they aid or agree to aid or attempt to aid such other person in planning,
committing, or attempting to commit the offense.
B.
However, a person is not so responsible
if:
1.
They are the victim of the offense
committed or attempted;
2.
The offense is so defined that their
conduct was necessarily incident to the commission or attempt to commit
the offense. If their conduct constitutes a related but separate offense,
they are responsible for that offense but not for the conduct or offense
committed or attempted by the other person;
3.
Before the commission of the offense
such person abandons their purpose and gives timely warning to law
enforcement authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent
the commission of the offense.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.230; CC 1968 § 14-52; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A.
It is no defense to any prosecution for
an offense in which the responsibility of the defendant is based upon
the conduct of another that:
1.
Such other person has been acquitted
or has not been convicted or has been convicted of some other offense
or lacked capacity or was unaware of the defendant's criminal purpose
or is immune from prosecution or is not amenable to justice; or
2.
The defendant does not belong to
that class of persons who was legally capable of committing the offense
in an individual capacity.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.235; CC 1968 § 14-53; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A.
A Law Enforcement Officer need not retreat or desist from efforts to effect the arrest, or from efforts to prevent the escape from custody, of a person they reasonably believe to have committed an offense because of resistance or threatened resistance of the arrestee. In addition to the use of physical force authorized under other Statutes or ordinances, they are, subject to provisions of Subsections (B) and (C) below, justified in the use of such physical force as they reasonably believe is immediately necessary to effect the arrest or to prevent the escape from custody.
B.
The use of any physical force in making
an arrest is not justified under this Section unless the arrest is
lawful or the Law Enforcement Officer reasonably believes the arrest
is lawful.
C.
A Law Enforcement Officer in effecting
an arrest or in preventing an escape from custody is justified in
using deadly force:
[R.O. 1996 § 220.240; CC 1968 §§ 14-54,
14-56; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982; Ord.
No. 1857 § 1, 8-7-1989]
A.
It shall be unlawful for any person to
attempt to violate an ordinance of the City.
B.
A person is guilty of attempt to commit
an offense when, with the purpose of committing the offense, they
do any act which is a substantial step towards the commission of the
offense. A "substantial step" is conduct which is strongly corroborative
of the firmness of the actor's purpose to complete the commission
of the offense.
C.
It is no defense to a prosecution under
this Section that the offense attempted was, under the actual attendant
circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission, if such
offense could have been committed had the attendant circumstances
been as the actor believed them to be.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.245; CC 1968 §§ 14-55,
14-57; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982; Ord.
No. 1857 § 2, 8-7-1989]
A.
It shall be unlawful to conspire to violate
an ordinance of the City.
B.
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another
person or persons to commit an offense if, with the purpose of promoting
or facilitating the commission of an offense they agree with another
person or persons that they or one (1) or more of them will engage
in conduct which constitutes such offense.
[Ord. No. 4638 § 4, 12-19-2016]
C.
It is no defense to a prosecution for conspiring
to commit an offense that a person, who knows that a person with whom
they conspire to commit an offense has conspired with another person
or persons to commit the same offense, does not know the identity
of such other person or persons.
[Ord. No. 4638 § 4, 12-19-2016]
D.
If a person conspires to commit a number
of offenses, they are guilty of only one (1) conspiracy so long as
such multiple offenses are the object of the same agreement.
E.
No person may be convicted of conspiracy
to commit an offense unless an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy
is alleged and proved to have been done by them or by a person with
whom they conspired.
F.
No one shall be convicted of conspiracy
if, after conspiring to commit the offense, they prevented the accomplishment
of the objectives of the conspiracy under circumstances manifesting
a renunciation of their criminal purpose. The defendant shall have
the burden of injecting the issue of renunciation of criminal purpose
under this Subsection.
G.
For the purpose of time limitations on
prosecutions:
1.
Conspiracy is a continuing course
of conduct which terminates when the offense or offenses which are
its object are committed or the agreement that they be committed is
abandoned by the defendant and by those with whom they conspired.
2.
If an individual abandons the agreement,
the conspiracy is terminated as to them only if they advise those
with whom they have conspired of their abandonment or they inform
the law enforcement authorities of the existence of the conspiracy
and of their participation in it.
H.
A person may not be charged, convicted
or sentenced on the basis of the same course of conduct of both the
actual commission of an offense and a conspiracy to commit that offense.
