[R.O. 1996 § 220.190; CC 1968 § 14-45; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A. 
A person is not guilty of an offense unless their liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act.
B. 
A "voluntary act" is:
1. 
A bodily movement performed while conscious as a result of effort or determination; or
2. 
An omission to perform an act of which the actor is physically capable.
C. 
Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly procures or receives the thing possessed, or having acquired control of it was aware of their control for a sufficient time to have enabled them to dispose of it or terminate their control.
D. 
A person is not guilty of an offense based solely upon an omission to perform an act unless the law defining the offense expressly so provides, or a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.200; CC 1968 § 14-46; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A. 
Except as provided in Section 220.210, a person is not guilty of an offense unless they act with a culpable mental state, that is, unless they act purposely or knowingly or recklessly or with criminal negligence, as the ordinance defining the offense may require with respect to the conduct, the result thereof or the attendant circumstances which constitute the material elements of the offense.
B. 
A person "acts purposely," or with purpose, with respect to their conduct or to a result thereof, when it is their conscious object to engage in that conduct or to cause that result.
C. 
A person "acts knowingly" or with knowledge:
1. 
With respect to their conduct or to attendant circumstances when the are aware of the nature of their conduct or that those circumstances exist; or
2. 
With respect to a result of their conduct when they are aware that their conduct is practically certain to cause that result.
D. 
A person "acts recklessly" or is reckless when they consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
E. 
A person "acts with criminal negligence" or is criminally negligent when they fail to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, and such failure constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.205; CC 1968 § 14-47; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A. 
If the definition of an offense prescribes a culpable mental state but does not specify the conduct, attendant circumstances, or result to which it applies, the prescribed culpable mental state applies to each such material element.
B. 
If the definition of an offense prescribes criminal negligence as the culpable mental state, it is also established if a person acts purposely or knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish a culpable mental state, it is also established if a person acts purposely or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish a culpable mental state, it is also established if a person acts purposely.
C. 
Knowledge that conduct constitutes an offense, or knowledge of the existence, meaning or application of the ordinance defining an offense is not an element of an offense unless the ordinance clearly so provides.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.210; CC 1968 § 14-48; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A. 
A culpable mental state is not required:
1. 
If no culpable mental state is prescribed by the ordinance defining the offense; or
2. 
If the ordinance defining the offense clearly indicates a purpose to dispense with the requirement of any culpable mental state as to a specific element of the offense.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.215; CC 1968 § 14-49; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A. 
A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because they engage in such conduct under a mistaken belief of fact or law unless such mistake negatives the existence of the mental state required by the offense.
B. 
A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because they believe their conduct does not constitute an offense unless their belief is reasonable and:
1. 
The offense is defined by an administrative regulation or order which is not known to them and has not been published or otherwise made reasonably available to them, and they could not have acquired such knowledge by the exercise of due diligence pursuant to facts known to them; or
2. 
They act in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in:
a. 
A Statute or ordinance;
b. 
An opinion or order of an Appellate Court;
c. 
An official interpretation of the Statute, regulation, or order defining the offense made by a public official or agency legally authorized to interpret such Statute, regulation, or order.
C. 
The burden of injecting the issue of a reasonable belief that conduct does not constitute an offense under Subsection (B)(1) and (2) is on the defendant.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.220; CC 1968 § 14-50; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A person with the required culpable mental state is guilty of an offense if it is committed by their own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which they are criminally responsible as set out in Section 220.225, or both.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.225; CC 1968 § 14-51; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A. 
A person is responsible for the conduct of another when:
1. 
The ordinance defining the offense makes them so responsible; or
2. 
Either before or during the commission of an offense with the purpose of promoting the commission of an offense, they aid or agree to aid or attempt to aid such other person in planning, committing, or attempting to commit the offense.
B. 
However, a person is not so responsible if:
1. 
They are the victim of the offense committed or attempted;
2. 
The offense is so defined that their conduct was necessarily incident to the commission or attempt to commit the offense. If their conduct constitutes a related but separate offense, they are responsible for that offense but not for the conduct or offense committed or attempted by the other person;
3. 
Before the commission of the offense such person abandons their purpose and gives timely warning to law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.
C. 
The defense provided by Subsection (B)(3) hereof is an affirmative defense.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.230; CC 1968 § 14-52; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A. 
It is no defense to any prosecution for an offense in which the responsibility of the defendant is based upon the conduct of another that:
1. 
Such other person has been acquitted or has not been convicted or has been convicted of some other offense or lacked capacity or was unaware of the defendant's criminal purpose or is immune from prosecution or is not amenable to justice; or
2. 
The defendant does not belong to that class of persons who was legally capable of committing the offense in an individual capacity.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.235; CC 1968 § 14-53; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982]
A. 
A Law Enforcement Officer need not retreat or desist from efforts to effect the arrest, or from efforts to prevent the escape from custody, of a person they reasonably believe to have committed an offense because of resistance or threatened resistance of the arrestee. In addition to the use of physical force authorized under other Statutes or ordinances, they are, subject to provisions of Subsections (B) and (C) below, justified in the use of such physical force as they reasonably believe is immediately necessary to effect the arrest or to prevent the escape from custody.
B. 
The use of any physical force in making an arrest is not justified under this Section unless the arrest is lawful or the Law Enforcement Officer reasonably believes the arrest is lawful.
C. 
A Law Enforcement Officer in effecting an arrest or in preventing an escape from custody is justified in using deadly force:
1. 
When such is authorized under other ordinances or Statutes; or
2. 
When they reasonably believe that such use of deadly force is immediately necessary to effect the arrest and also reasonably believe that the person to be arrested:
a. 
Has committed or attempted to commit a dangerous violent felony; and
b. 
Is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon; or
c. 
May otherwise endanger life or inflict serious physical injury unless arrested without delay.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.240; CC 1968 §§ 14-54, 14-56; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982; Ord. No. 1857 § 1, 8-7-1989]
A. 
It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt to violate an ordinance of the City.
B. 
A person is guilty of attempt to commit an offense when, with the purpose of committing the offense, they do any act which is a substantial step towards the commission of the offense. A "substantial step" is conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the actor's purpose to complete the commission of the offense.
C. 
It is no defense to a prosecution under this Section that the offense attempted was, under the actual attendant circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission, if such offense could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be.
[R.O. 1996 § 220.245; CC 1968 §§ 14-55, 14-57; Ord. No. 1147 § 1, 4-12-1982; Ord. No. 1857 § 2, 8-7-1989]
A. 
It shall be unlawful to conspire to violate an ordinance of the City.
B. 
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit an offense if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense they agree with another person or persons that they or one (1) or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such offense.
[Ord. No. 4638 § 4, 12-19-2016]
C. 
It is no defense to a prosecution for conspiring to commit an offense that a person, who knows that a person with whom they conspire to commit an offense has conspired with another person or persons to commit the same offense, does not know the identity of such other person or persons.
[Ord. No. 4638 § 4, 12-19-2016]
D. 
If a person conspires to commit a number of offenses, they are guilty of only one (1) conspiracy so long as such multiple offenses are the object of the same agreement.
E. 
No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense unless an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by them or by a person with whom they conspired.
F. 
No one shall be convicted of conspiracy if, after conspiring to commit the offense, they prevented the accomplishment of the objectives of the conspiracy under circumstances manifesting a renunciation of their criminal purpose. The defendant shall have the burden of injecting the issue of renunciation of criminal purpose under this Subsection.
G. 
For the purpose of time limitations on prosecutions:
1. 
Conspiracy is a continuing course of conduct which terminates when the offense or offenses which are its object are committed or the agreement that they be committed is abandoned by the defendant and by those with whom they conspired.
2. 
If an individual abandons the agreement, the conspiracy is terminated as to them only if they advise those with whom they have conspired of their abandonment or they inform the law enforcement authorities of the existence of the conspiracy and of their participation in it.
H. 
A person may not be charged, convicted or sentenced on the basis of the same course of conduct of both the actual commission of an offense and a conspiracy to commit that offense.