A.
Whereas, sexually oriented businesses require special supervision from the public safety agencies of the Township in order to protect and preserve the health, safety, and welfare of the patrons of such businesses as well as the citizens of the Township; and
B.
Whereas, the Board of Trustees finds that sexually oriented businesses, as a category of establishments, are frequently used for unlawful sexual activities, including prostitution and sexual liaisons of a casual nature; and
C.
Whereas, there is convincing documented evidence that sexually oriented businesses, as a category of establishments, have deleterious secondary effects and are often associated with crime and adverse effects on surrounding properties; and
D.
Whereas, the Board of Trustees desires to minimize and control these adverse effects and thereby protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry; protect the citizens from crime; preserve the quality of life; preserve the character of surrounding neighborhoods and deter the spread of urban blight; and
E.
Whereas, certain sexually oriented products and services offered to the public are recognized as not inherently expressive and not protected by the First Amendment, see, e.g., Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1195 (10th Cir. 2003) ("On its face, the Ordinance applies to all 'sexually oriented businesses,' which include establishments such as 'adult motels' and 'adult novelty stores,' which are not engaged in expressive activity."); Sewell v. Georgia, 233 S.E.2d 187 (Ga. 1977), dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 435 U.S. 982 (1978) (sexual devices); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 224 (1990) (escort services and sexual encounter services); and
F.
Whereas, there is documented evidence of sexually oriented businesses, including adult bookstores and adult video stores, manipulating their inventory and/or business practices to avoid regulation while retaining their essentially "adult" nature, see, e.g., Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C. v. City of Littleton, Civil Action No. 99-N-1696, Memorandum Decision and Order (D. Colo. March 31, 2001) (finding retail adult store's "argument that it is not an adult entertainment establishment" to be "frivolous at best"); People ex rel. Deters v. The Lion's Den, Inc., Case No. 04-CH-26, Modified Permanent Injunction Order (III. Fourth Judicial Circuit, Effingham County, July 13, 2005) (noting that "the accuracy and credibility" of the evidence on inventory in adult retail store was suspect, and that testimony was "less than candid" and "suggested an intention to obscure the actual amount of sexually explicit material sold"); City of New York v. Hommes, 724 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y. 1999) (documenting manipulation of inventory to avoid adult classification); Taylor v. State, No. 01-01-00505-CR, 2002 WL 1722154 (Tex. App. July 25, 2002) (noting that "the nonadult video selections appeared old and several of its display cases were covered with cobwebs"); and
G.
Whereas, the manner in which an establishment holds itself out to the public is a reasonable consideration in determining whether the establishment is a sexually oriented business, see, e.g., East Brooks Books, Inc. v. Shelby County, 588 F.3d 360, 365 (6th Cir. 2009) ("A prominent display advertising an establishment as an 'adult store,' moreover, is a more objective indicator that the store is of the kind the Act aims to regulate, than the mere share of its stock or trade comprised of adult materials."); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 261 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]t is most implausible that any enterprise which has as its constant intentional objective the sale of such [sexual] material does not advertise or promote it as such."); Patterson v. City of Grand Forks, Case No. 18-2012-CV-00742 (Nov. 1, 2012) (upholding sex paraphernalia store location restriction which exempted stores in regional shopping malls because malls on are on large parcels that buffer sensitive land uses, have their own security personnel, and limit signage and hours of operation); see also Johnson v. California State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to statute which used the phrase "holding out" to identify conduct indicative of the practice of public accountancy, but did not ban any speech); Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2010) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (concluding that whether an entity "holds itself out" as religious is a neutral factor and that factor helps to ensure that the entity is a bona fide religious entity); and
H.
Whereas, the Township intends to regulate such businesses as sexually oriented businesses through a narrowly tailored ordinance designed to serve the substantial government interest in preventing the negative secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses; and
I.
Whereas, the Township's regulations shall be narrowly construed to accomplish this end; and
J.
Whereas, the Township recognizes its constitutional duty to interpret and construe its laws to comply with constitutional requirements as they are announced; and
K.
Whereas, with the passage of any ordinance, the Township and the Board of Trustees accept as binding the applicability of general principles of criminal and civil law and procedure and the rights and obligations under the United States and Michigan Constitutions, Michigan Code, and the Michigan Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure; and
L.
Whereas, it is not the intent of this ordinance to suppress any speech activities protected by the U.S. Constitution or the Michigan Constitution, but to enact ordinance to further the content-neutral governmental interests of the Township, to wit, the controlling of secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses.
M.
Now, therefore, Pittsfield Charter Township, Washtenaw County, Michigan hereby ordains that the following ordinance be enacted.