[R.O. 1996 § 215.570; Ord. No. 836 § 16-239, 2-8-1993]
A. 
A person is not guilty of an offense unless his/her liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act.
B. 
A "voluntary act" is:
1. 
A bodily movement performed while conscious as a result of effort or determination; or
2. 
An omission to perform an act of which the actor is physically capable.
C. 
Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly procures or receives the thing possessed, or having acquired control of it was aware of his/her control for a sufficient time to have enabled him/her to dispose of it or terminate his/her control.
D. 
A person is not guilty of an offense based solely upon an omission to perform an act unless the law defining the offense expressly so provides, or a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law.
[R.O. 1996 § 215.580; Ord. No. 836 § 16-240, 2-8-1993]
A. 
Except as provided in Section 215.590, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he/she acts with a culpable mental state, that is, unless he/she acts purposely or knowingly or recklessly or with criminal negligence, as the ordinance defining the offense may require with respect to the conduct, the result thereof or the attendant circumstances which constitute the material elements of the offense.
B. 
A person "acts purposely," or with purpose, with respect to his/her conduct or to a result thereof, when it is his/her conscious object to engage in that conduct or to cause that result.
C. 
A person "acts knowingly" or with knowledge:
1. 
With respect to his/her conduct or to attendant circumstances when he/she is aware of the nature of his/her conduct or that those circumstances exist; or
2. 
With respect to a result of his/her conduct when he/she is aware that his/her conduct is practically certain to cause that result.
D. 
A person "acts recklessly" or is reckless when he/she consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
E. 
A person "acts with criminal negligence" or is criminally negligent when he/she fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, and such failure constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
[R.O. 1996 § 215.590; Ord. No. 836 § 16-241, 2-8-1993]
A. 
If the definition of any offense prescribes a culpable mental state but does not specify the conduct, attendant circumstances or result to which it applies, the prescribed culpable mental state applies to each such material element.
B. 
If the definition of an offense prescribes a culpable mental state with regard to a particular element or elements of that offense, the prescribed culpable mental state shall be required only as to specified element or elements, and a culpable mental state shall not be required as to any other element of the offense.
C. 
Except as provided in Subsection (B) of this Section and Section 215.600, if the definition of any offense does not expressly prescribe a culpable mental state for any elements of the offense, a culpable mental state is nonetheless required and is established if a person acts purposely or knowingly; but reckless or criminally negligent acts do not establish such culpable mental state.
D. 
If the definition of an offense prescribes criminal negligence as the culpable mental state, it is also established if a person acts purposely or knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish a culpable mental state, it is also established if a person acts purposely or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish a culpable mental state, it is also established if a person acts purposely.
E. 
Knowledge that conduct constitutes an offense, or knowledge of the existence, meaning or application of the statute defining an offense is not an element of an offense unless the statute clearly so provides.
[R.O. 1996 § 215.600; Ord. No. 836 § 16-242, 2-8-1993]
A. 
A culpable mental state is not required:
1. 
If the offense is an infraction and no culpable mental state is prescribed by the statute defining the offense; or
2. 
If the offense is a felony or misdemeanor and no culpable mental state is prescribed by the statute defining the offense, and imputation of a culpable mental state to the offense is clearly inconsistent with the purpose of the statute defining the offense or may lead to an absurd or unjust result.
[R.O. 1996 § 215.610]
A. 
A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he/she engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief of fact or law unless such mistake negatives the existence of the mental state required by the offense.
B. 
A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he/she believes his/her conduct does not constitute an offense unless his/her belief is reasonable, and:
1. 
The offense is defined by an administrative regulation or order which is not known to him/her and has not been published or otherwise made reasonably available to him/her, and he/she could not have acquired such knowledge by the exercise of due diligence pursuant to facts known to him/her; or
2. 
He/she acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in:
a. 
A statute;
b. 
An opinion or order of an appellate court;
c. 
An official interpretation of the statute, regulation or order defining the offense made by a public official or agency legally authorized to interpret such statute, regulation or order.
3. 
The burden of injecting the issue of reasonable belief that conduct does not constitute an offense under Subsection (B)(1) and (2) is on the defendant.
[R.O. 1996 § 215.620; Ord. No. 836 § 16-244, 2-8-1993]
A person with the required culpable mental state is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his/her own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he/she is responsible as set out in Section 215.610, or both.
[R.O. 1996 § 215.630; Ord. No. 836 § 16-245, 2-8-1993]
A. 
A person is reasonable for the conduct of another when:
1. 
The ordinance defining the offense makes him/her so responsible; or
2. 
Either before or during the commission of an offense with the purpose of promoting the commission of an offense, he/she aids or agrees to aid or attempts to aid such other person in planning, committing, or attempting to commit the offense.
B. 
However, a person is not so responsible if:
1. 
He/she is the victim of the offense committed or attempted;
2. 
The offense is so defined that his/her conduct was necessarily incident to the commission or attempt to commit the offense. If his/her conduct constitutes a related but separate offense he/she is responsible for that offense but not or the conduct of offense committed or attempted by the other person;
3. 
Before the commission of the offense he/she abandons his/her purpose and gives timely warning to Law Enforcement Authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.
C. 
The defense provided by Subsection (B)(3) is an affirmative defense.
[R.O. 1996 § 215.640; Ord. No. 836 § 16-246, 2-8-1993]
A. 
It is no defense to any prosecution for an offense in which the responsibility of the defendant is based upon the conduct of another that:
1. 
Such other person has been acquitted or has not been convicted or has been convicted of some other offense or degree of offense or lacked criminal capacity or was unaware of the defendant's criminal purpose or is immune from prosecution or is not amenable to justice; or
2. 
The defendant does not belong to that class of persons who was legally capable of committing the offense in an individual capacity.
[R.O. 1996 § 215.650; Ord. No. 836 § 16-247, 2-8-1993]
A. 
A Law Enforcement Officer need not retreat or desist from efforts to effect the arrest, or from efforts to prevent the escape from custody, of a person he/she reasonably believes to have committed an offense because of resistance or threatened resistance of the arrestee. In addition to the use of physical force authorized under other statutes or ordinances, he/she is, subject to provisions of Subsections (B) and (C) below, justified in the use of such physical force as he/she reasonably believes is immediately necessary to effect the arrest or to prevent the escape from custody.
B. 
The use of any physical force in making an arrest is not justified under this Section unless the arrest is lawful or the Law Enforcement Officer reasonably believes the arrest is lawful.
C. 
A Law Enforcement Officer in effecting an arrest or preventing an escape from custody is justified in using deadly force:
1. 
When such is authorized under other ordinances or statutes; or
2. 
When he/she reasonably believes that such use of deadly force is immediately necessary to effect the arrest and also reasonably believes that the person to be arrested:
a. 
Has committed or attempted to commit a dangerous violent felony; or
b. 
Is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon; or
c. 
May otherwise endanger life or inflict serious physical injury unless arrested without delay.
[R.O. 1996 § 215.660; Ord. No. 836 § 16-248, 2-8-1993]
A. 
Guilt for an offense may be based upon an attempt to commit an offense if, with the purpose of committing the offense, a person performs any act which is a substantial step towards the commission of the offense. A "substantial step" is conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the actor's purpose to complete the commission of the offense.
B. 
It is no defense to a prosecution under this Section that the offense attempted was, under the actual attendant circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission, if such offense could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be.
[R.O. 1996 § 215.670; Ord. No. 836 § 16-249, 2-8-1993]
A. 
A person commits the offense of conspiracy to commit, in any manner or for any purpose, an offense if the person agrees, with one (1) or more persons, to commit any class A, B, or C felony offense, or any unclassified felony offenses if the maximum term of imprisonment for such unclassified felony exceeds ten (10) years or more, and one (1) or more of such persons do any act in furtherance of such an agreement.
B. 
It is no defense to a prosecution for conspiring to commit an offense that a person, who knows that a person with whom he or she conspires to commit an offense has conspired with another person or persons to commit the same offense, does not know the identity of such other person or persons.
C. 
If a person conspires to commit a number of offenses, he or she can be found guilty of only one (1) offense of conspiracy so long as such multiple offenses are the object of the same agreement.
D. 
Renunciation As A Defense.
1. 
No person shall be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense if, after conspiring to commit the offense, he or she prevented the accomplishment of the objectives of the conspiracy under circumstances manifesting a renunciation of his or her criminal purpose.
2. 
The defendant shall have the burden of injecting the issue of renunciation of criminal purpose under Subsection (D)(1) of this Section.
E. 
For the purpose of time limitations on prosecutions:
1. 
A conspiracy to commit an offense is a continuing course of conduct which terminates when the offense or offenses which are its object are committed or the agreement that they be committed is abandoned by the defendant and by those with whom he or she conspired;
2. 
If an individual abandons the agreement, the conspiracy is terminated as to him or her only if he or she advises those with whom he or she has conspired of his or her abandonment or he or she informs the Law Enforcement Authorities of the existence of the conspiracy and of his or her participation in it.
[Ord. No. 2336, 8-11-2014]
A. 
No person shall possess any open container of any alcoholic beverage, nor shall any person consume or drink any alcoholic beverage on public property within the City of Grain Valley, including but not limited to any public building, street, alley, sidewalk, public lot, park, recreational facility or public facility, except as provided in this Section.
B. 
The prohibition in this Section shall not apply to the possession or consumption of alcoholic beverages within premises licensed to sell alcoholic beverages by the drink or properly located on public property pursuant to the liquor license of the holder allowing such consumption.
C. 
The prohibition in this Section shall not apply to the possession or consumption of alcoholic beverages in or at the following public facilities where the City or lessor of the facility has authorized the possession or consumption of the alcoholic beverage pursuant to an approved written agreement setting forth all terms and conditions for said possession or consumption of alcoholic beverages in restricted areas:
1. 
Grain Valley Community Center: Only allowed inside the building in the main multipurpose room.
2. 
Grain Valley Pavilion and designated City shelter areas, and the Grain Valley Pavilion Field: Only allowed in specific fenced off areas during Valley Fair Days or special events.